Bankers, Guns, and Money: Financial Assistance for Terrorism Under the Prevention of Terrorism Act, 1989 by Ross, Margaret M
Boston College International and Comparative Law Review
Volume 14 | Issue 1 Article 5
12-1-1991
Bankers, Guns, and Money: Financial Assistance for
Terrorism Under the Prevention of Terrorism Act,
1989
Margaret M. Ross
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/iclr
Part of the Military, War and Peace Commons
This Notes is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Boston College International and Comparative Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Boston College Law
School. For more information, please contact nick.szydlowski@bc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Margaret M. Ross, Bankers, Guns, and Money: Financial Assistance for Terrorism Under the Prevention
of Terrorism Act, 1989, 14 B.C. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 77 (1991), http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/
iclr/vol14/iss1/5
Bankers, Guns, and Money: Financial 
Assistance for Terrorism Under the 
Prevention of Terrorism Act, 1989 
INTRODUCTION 
August 14, 1989, marked the twentieth anniversary of Great 
Britain's military presence in Northern Ireland and its seven-
teenth year of direct rule over the politically troubled province. l 
During the past twenty years, the British government has imple-
mented emergency and anti-terrorist legislation in Northern Ire-
land and the United Kingdom to combat Northern Irish terror-
ism and to penalize those who support it.2 Recognizing the need 
to combat financial support for terrorism, Parliament introduced 
provisions under the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Pro-
visions) Act, 1989 (1989 Act) that criminalize money laundering 
in support of terrorism.3 
During parliamentary debates of the 1989 Act, members of 
both Houses of Parliament encouraged their colleagues to sup-
1 Magee, Statistical Reminders, FORTNIGHT, Sept. 1989, at 13 (twentieth anniversary of 
British military presence in Northern Ireland); Hadden, Boyle & Campbell, Emergency 
Law in Northern Ireland: The Context, in JUSTICE UNDER FIRE: THE ABUSE OF CIVIL LIBERTIES 
IN NORTHERN IRELAND 2-6 (A. Jennings ed. 1988) (overview of British policy and rule in 
Northern Ireland since 1969). 
2 See Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1987, ch. 30 [hereinafter 1987 
Emergency Act); Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1978, ch. 5 [hereinafter 
1978 Emergency Act). Emergency legislation has been implemented exclusively in North-
ern Ireland. These Emergency Acts detail criminal procedures and rights of the accused. 
See J. Jackson, The Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1987, 39 N. IRL. LEGAL Q. 
235 (1988). Alternatively, anti-terrorist legislation enacted by Parliament applies to North-
ern Ireland, Great Britain, Wales, and Scotland. See, e.g., Prevention of Terrorism (Tem-
porary Provisions) Act, 1989, ch. 6; Interview with John Jackson, Barrister-at-Law, Lec-
turer in Law in the Queen's University, Belfast, in Newton, MA (Mar. 19, 1990). This 
Note addresses the Prevention of Terrorism Act, 1989 [hereinafter 1989 Act) and its 
predecessors, Prevention of Terrorism Act, 1984, ch. 8 [hereinafter 1984 Act), Prevention 
of Terrorism Act, 1976, ch. 8 [hereinafter 1976 Act), and Prevention of Terrorism Act, 
1974, ch. 56 [hereinafter 1974 Act). 
3 1989 Act, supra note 2, at pt. III, § 11. The Prevention of Terrorism Act, 1989 came 
into effect on March 22, 1989. 1989 Act, supra note 2, at § 27. Selected provisions including 
schedule 4 of the 1989 Act came into effect on September 1, 1989. See Cowdry, Police put 
Squeeze on IRA Fundraisers, The Times (London), Sept. 2, 1989, at 5, co!. a. Section 27, 
Commencement and Duration, stipulates annual review of the Act's provisions. 1989 Act, 
supra note 2, at pt. VII, § 27. Nonetheless, it remains effective without expiration. 1989 
Act, supra note 2, at pt. VII, § 27. Sections not addressed in this Note include provisions 
concerning the remission of prison sentences and licensing of munitions factories under 
sections 22, 23, and 24 of the 1989 Act. 
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port legislation criminalizing terrorist money laundering.4 They 
pointed out the illicit sources of terrorist funding, which include 
fraud, extortion, racketeering, and control of legitimate busi-
nesses,5 and explained that such funds are subsequently "laun-
dered" through businesses or financial institutions to disguise 
their sources and their ultimate destinations.6 Measures crimin-
alizing third-party financial assistance for terrorism7 were enacted 
by royal assent on March 22, 1989.8 
4 504 ParI. Deb., H.L. (5th Ser.) 14 (1989). Earl Ferrers admonished his colleagues to 
grant police extraordinary police powers under the 1989 Act to combat the source and 
control of terrorist funding in his presentation of the Act during its Second Reading 
before the House of Lords. Lord Colonbrook asserted a similar position when he argued: 
"[A]nything we can ... do to deprive [terrorists] of money will be a severe blow to their 
campaign." See also 504 ParI. Deb., H.L. (5th Ser.) 30 (1989). 
5 REVIEW OF THE OPERATION OF THE PREVENTION OF TERRORISM (TEMPORARY PROVI-
SIONS) ACT, 1976, 1983, CMND. SER. _, No. 8803, at 82 [hereinafter JELLICOE REPORT]. 
Jellicoe cites Sir John Hermon, Chief Constable of the Northern Irish Police, the Royal 
Ulster Constabulary (RUC): 
[M]oney is crucial in the continuance of terrorism .... Quite simply it finances 
murder and destruction. Every pound in the coffers of the paramilitary organ-
isations is a nail in the coffin of an innocent victim of their murder gangs. 
6 Bonner, Combating Terrorism in the 1990s, PUB. L. 440, n.3 (1989). David Bonner, writ-
ing on the financial provisions of the 1989 Act, provides a definition of money laun-
dering: "Laundering here denotes the process whereby proceeds and profits from crimin-
al enterprises are converted through businesses and financial institutions into respectable 
funds, properties and accounts." An American commentator defines money laundering as 
"a process whereby one conceals the existence, illegal source, or illegal application of 
income, and then disguises that income to make it appear legitimate." Plombeck, Con-
fidentiality and Disclosure: The Money Laundering Control Act of 1986 and Banking Secrecy, 22 
INT'L LAW. 69, 70 n.6 (1988). Lord Colonbrook described the practice in layman's terms: 
The terrorists get money in all sorts of other ways ... some legal but most of it 
illegal. The difficulty-and it is increasing-is that if they manage to get money 
illegally they can launder it. I am no financier, but I think that that is the right 
word. In other words they make it into legal money, and as it has been said, they 
invest it in enterprises quite properly while hiding the fact that it was improperly 
come by. 
504 ParI. Deb., H.L. (5th Ser.) 30 (1989). Cf Fialka, Cleaning Up: How Big Drug Cartel 
Laundered $1.2 Billion with Aid of u.s. Firms, Wall St. j., Mar. 1, 1990 at 1, col. 3. 
7 1989 Act, supra note 2, at pt. V, § 20. Section 20 defines terrorism broadly as "the 
use of violence for political ends, and includes any use of violence for the purpose of 
putting the public or any section of the public in fear." 1d.; 1984 Act, supra note 2, at pt. 
V, § 14(1); 1976 Act, supra note 2, at pt. III, § 14(1); 1974 Act, supra note 2, at pt. III, 
§ 9(1). In McKee v. Chief Constable, [1988] N. Ir. 164, 183-84, Lord Roskill ruled that an 
identical provision under the 1978 Emergency Act should be construed broadly. See 1978 
Emergency Act, supra note 2, at pt. IV, § 31(1). The 1989 Act also broadly defines "terrorist 
funds." They are defined as: 
(a) funds which may be applied or used for the commission of or in furtherance 
of or in connection with, acts of terrorism .... 
(b) the proceeds of the commission of such acts of terrorism or of activities 
engaged in furtherance of or in connection with such acts; and 
(c) the resources of a proscribed organisation. 
1989 Act, supra note 2, at pt. III, § 11(3)-(4). 
8 1d. at pt. VII, § 27. 
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Unlike other provisions under the 1989 Act, the recent money 
laundering provisions9 are not directed at terrorists themselves, 
but rather at those third parties who assist them. Bankers from 
the United Kingdom, as well as international bankers who deal 
in Great Britain, Northern Ireland, or Scotland, fall within the 
ambit of the 1989 Act. They face stiff criminal penalties including 
fines and imprisonment for their financial involvement with ter-
rorist groups.lO 
While penalties for money laundering are not new to British 
law, the 1989 Act uniquely burdens the United Kingdom's bank-
ing community. I I The Act shifts the burden of proof to bankers 
who handle alleged terrorist funds to prove that they are not 
assisting terrorist activities. The provisions also compel full dis-
closure of bankers' actions which may assist terrorists l2 even 
though such disclosure contravenes bankers' duties of confiden-
tiality. As a result, bankers are required to disclose the details of 
their customers' transactions, relate suspicious transactions to po-
lice, and screen new customers to avoid transactions with potential 
terrorists. How bankers will determine which customers are ter-
rorists is unclear.13 Without expert knowledge or investigatory 
9 1989 Act, supra note 2, at pt. III, § 11. The money laundering provisions, entitled 
"Financial Assistance for Terrorism," provide in pertinent part: 
(I) A person is guilty of an offence if he enters into or is otherwise concerned 
in an arrangement whereby the retention or control by or on behalf of another 
person of terrorist funds is facilitated, whether by concealment, removal from 
the jurisdiction, transfer to nominees or otherwise. 
(2) In proceedings against a person for an offence under this section it is a 
defence to prove that he did not know and had no reasonable cause to suspect 
that the arrangement related to terrorist funds. 
See generally REVIEW OF OPERATION OF THE PREVENTION OF TERRORISM (TEMPORARY PRO-
VISIONS) ACT 1984 BY THE VISCOUNT COLVILLE OF CULROSS Q.C., 1987, CMND. SER. _, 
No. 264, at 47-49 [hereinafter COLVILLE REPORT)' Lord Colville prepared a report on 
the financial provisions of the 1984 Act and provided recommendations for the 1989 
Act's financial provisions. 
10 1989 Act, supra note 2, at pt. III, § 13(1)(a)-(b). The 1989 Act provides penalty and 
forfeiture provisions for those convicted under the Act's money laundering offense. 
Convictions upon indictment result in a term of imprisonment not exceeding fourteen 
years or a fine or both while summary convictions result in reduced terms of imprisonment 
not exceeding six months or a fine or both. 
11 See infra notes 144-47 and accompanying text. 
12 1989 Act, supra note 2, at pt. III, § 12, pt. V, § § 17-18. 
13 See Hadden, supra note I (context of emergency and anti-terrorist legislation); P. 
BISHOP & E. MALLIE, THE PROVISIONAL I.R.A. (1987) (discussion of the Provisional Irish 
Republican Army (IRA)); C. WALKER, THE PREVENTION OF TERRORISM IN BRITISH LAW 
1-21 (1987) (overview of terrorism and terrorist groups); D. BERESFORD, TEN MEN DEAD 
(1987); J. HOLLAND, Too LONG A SACRIFICE 213-20 (1981) (glossary of paramilitaries 
active in Northern Ireland since 1969). Terrorist groups in Northern Ireland include 
both Catholic Republican paramilitaries such as the IRA and the Irish National Liberation 
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experience, bankers are faced with an intractable dilemma-ei-
ther accept funds of questionable origin and risk fines and im-
prisonment, or turn down potentially legitimate customers and 
forego lucrative business opportunities. V ntil Parliament pro-
vides the banking community with an alternative, bankers must 
choose between these problematic alternatives. 
This Note addresses the Prevention of Terrorism Act, 1989-
its historical background, provisions, and effectiveness. Part I 
reviews the political and legislative background of the four Pre-
vention of Terrorism Acts, emphasizing the origins of the 1989 
Act and the nature of terrorist funding and money laundering. 
In addition, Part I discusses the Drug Trafficking Offences Act, 
1986 (Drug Act), the predecessor and model for the 1989 Act's 
money laundering provisions. 14 Part I also contrasts a banker's 
duty to disclose under the Drug Act with his or her countervailing 
common law duty of confidentiality. Part II focuses on the money 
laundering offense under section 11 of the 1989 Act and partic-
ularly, the elements of the offense and disclosure requirements. 
Part III then offers a V.S. regulatory alternative to the 1989 Act's 
money laundering provisions. Finally, Part IV compares the 1989 
Act's provisions with its various alternatives. This Note concludes 
that the 1989 Act is poorly tailored to its purpose of curtailing 
terrorist money laundering and unnecessarily burdens the V nited 
Kingdom's banking community. In contrast, an approach similar 
to the V.S. regulatory alternative would provide a less burden-
some and ambiguous approach to money laundering prosecution. 
Such an approach would place banks in the position of cooper-
ating with, rather than being the targets of, terrorist money laun-
dering investigations. 
I. POLITICAL BACKGROUND 
A. The Politics of Violence in Northern Ireland and Great Britain 
The original Prevention of Terrorism Act was enacted m 
1974 in response to renewed sectarian violence in Northern 
Army (IN LA) and Protestant Loyalist forces such as the Ulster Freedom Fighters (UFF) 
and the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF). For discussions of international terrorism, see 143 
ParI. Deb., H.C. (6th Ser.) 214 (1989) (Hurd discussing Abu Nidahl); J. ADAMS, THE 
FINANCING OF TERRORISM 13-130 and 187-252; 143 ParI. Deb., H.C. (6th Ser.) 259 (1989); 
Bonner, supra note 6, at 457 (discussing the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in 
Great Britain); COLVILLE REPORT, supra note 9, at 3-4. 
14 Drug Trafficking Offences Act, 1986, ch. 32 [hereinafter Drug Act]. The Drug Act 
enumerates the elements of the money laundering offense and a banker's affirmative 
duty to disclose information concerning narcotics trafficking. 
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Ireland. 15 Protests which began as peaceful civil rights mar-
ches in 1968 quickly deteriorated into riots when Protestants 
and police confronted Catholic marchers. 16 Beginning in 
1968 and continuing through the Act's assent in 1974, 
Northern Ireland's Catholic minority clashed repeatedly with 
the province's Protestant majority over issues of discrimi-
nation. Eventually, the clashes themselves became a source of 
continued violence. Paramilitary groups on either side of 
Northern Ireland's religious and political divide, Protestant 
Loyalists and Catholic Republicans, took up the cause of sectarian 
violence .17 
These repeated clashes precipitated British initiatives to end 
the violence. Parliament deployed troops in Northern Ireland 
and ordered the reorganization of Northern Ireland's police 
force in response to Catholic claims that police had sided with 
and aided Loyalist paramilitaries. 18 Parliament also pressured 
Northern Irish lawmakers to legislate reforms guaranteeing Cath-
olics equal treatment and freedom from discrimination. 19 In 
March 1972, it took a further step and suspended Northern 
Ireland's Parliament.2o Since 1972, Britain has ruled Northern 
Ireland directly. 
Neither the proposed reforms nor direct rule stemmed the 
violence.21 Death tolls peaked in 1972 with 468 deaths attributed 
15 Hadden, supra note 1, at 3. The origins of Northern Ireland's sectarian problems in 
the twentieth century began with Ireland's partition in 1921. Observers have explained 
the consequences of this division as: 
a pragmatic British decision to partition Ireland in response to the fact that while 
in the whole of Ireland a substantial majority of the population wanted indepen. 
dence, in the six north-eastern counties an equally substantial number wanted to 
remain British. For the next fifty years, Northern Ireland was governed ... [by] 
the exclusive interest of the majority community. From time to time there was a 
resumption of military activity by the [IRA] .... Within Northern Ireland there 
are currently one million Protestants, almost all of whom want to remain British 
and are passionately opposed to the reunification of Ireland, and more than half 
a million Catholics, most of whom aspire to eventual reunification. 
16 See P. BISHOP, supra note 13, at 1-81. 
17 White, From Conflict to Violence: The Re-emergence of the IRA and the Loyalist Response, 
in NORTHERN IRELAND: THE BACKGROUND TO THE CONFLICT, 184-85 (j. Darby ed. 1983). 
18 Hadden, supra note 1, at 2. 
19 See P. BISHOP, supra note 13, at 1-81. 
20 Hadden, supra note 1, at 2-6. 
21 N.Y. Times, Sept. 20, 1990, at A6, col. 3 (attempted assassination of former governor 
of Gibraltar who authorized Special Air Services (SAS) operation in which three IRA 
members were shot and killed); The Times (London), Mar. 7, 1988, at 1, col. a (British 
SAS officers shot and killed unarmed IRA bombing suspects); The Times (London), Nov. 
9, 1987, at 1, col. 1 (IRA Bomb kills eleven and injures sixty-one in Enniskillen, Northern 
Ireland); The Times (London), Oct. 13, 1984, at 1, col. a (IRA bomb attack in Brighton 
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to terrorist acts.22 Between 1973 and November 1974, 175 shoot-
ings and bombings occurred on British soip3 In response to the 
violence, Britain's Home Office prepared a draft version of the 
Prevention of Terrorism Act (1974 Act) and directed its provi-
sions against the Irish Republican Army (IRA).24 The 1974 Act 
criminalized membership in the IRA and limited the movement 
of IRA members throughout the United Kingdom. 
Continued violence assured the bill's passage. On November 
21,1974, members of the Birmingham Branch of the Provisional 
IRA detonated bombs in two crowded Birmingham public 
houses, killing twenty-one and wounding more than 160.25 The 
morning after the bombings, the Secretary of State for the Home 
Office, Roy Jenkins, called for emergency legislation.26 During 
subsequent debates, Birmingham's Member of Parliament, Brian 
Walden, assured fellow members that no legislation could be 
more important than the Prevention of Terrorism Act. In his 
estimation, justification for its passage was overwhelming. The 
draft legislation affirmed "the very first function of Government 
[which is] the maintenance of life and property."27 Parliament 
concurred and passed the bill on November 29, 1974, only seven 
days after the bombings.28 
B. General Provisions of the Prevention of Terrorism Acts 1974, 
1976, 1984, and 1989 
Parliament's intent in enacting the 1974 Act was twofold: first, 
to assert British control and legitimacy in Northern Ireland; and 
at Conservative Party conference-four dead, Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher un-
harmed); see also The Times (London), Nov. 9, 1987, at 1, col. a (catalogue of IRA 
bombings since 1978). 
22 Magee, supra note 1, at 13; see also C. WALKER, supra note 13, at 22-31. 
23 C. WALKER, supra note 13, at 22-31. 
24 1974 Act, supra note 2, at pt. I, Proscribed Organisations, and sched. 1, Proscribed 
Organisations (IRA only paramilitary group listed). 
25 881 ParI. Deb., H.C. (5th Ser.) 1671-82 (1974); 882 ParI. Deb., H.C. (5th Ser.) 635-
70 (1974). Six members were arrested and successfully prosecuted under the 1974 Act 
for the Birmingham bombings; their convictions have been appealed. See Toolis, Where 
British justice Failed, N.Y. Times, Feb. 25, 1990 § 6 (Magazine), at 36-38 (review of the 
Guilford Four and Birmingham Six convictions and appeals). See generally P. BISHOP, supra 
note 13, at 257-61 (Birmingham bombings); C. WALKER, supra note 13, at 22-31. 
26 881 ParI. Deb., H.C. (5th Ser.) 1671 (1974). 
27 882 ParI. Deb., H.C. (5th Ser.), 27-31 (1974). 
28 1974 Act, supra note 2, at Preamble. Consistent with its legislative purpose, the 1974 
Act's preamble explained that the 1974 Act was "[a]n Act to proscribe organisations 
concerned in terrorism ... , and to give power to exclude certain persons from Great 
Britain or the United Kingdom in order to prevent acts of Terrorism, and for connected 
purposes .... " 1974 Act, supra note 2, at Preamble. 
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second, to prevent the use of violence to achieve political ends in 
that province.29 Such was the intent of the three subsequent 
Prevention of Terrorism Acts. Under each Act, Parliament 
strengthened police powers in four basic areas: proscription of 
terrorist groups;30 restrictions on the free movement of suspected 
terrorists;31 extraordinary arrest and detention procedures;32 and 
immigration or port security checks.33 
Each Prevention of Terrorism Act has outlawed the IRA by 
declaring it a "proscribed organization."34 Lord Shackleton, the 
Parliament-appointed reviewer of the 1974 Act, explained that 
proscription served as an official condemnation of the IRA.35 
According to Shackleton, the organization was "highly offensive 
to the public at large" and those who "professed support in public 
for [it] or collected money for its activities should [not] do 
so entirely within the law." Under the 1984 and 1989 Acts, 
Parliament added to the Acts' list of proscribed organizations 
a second Republican paramilitary group, the Irish National 
Liberation Army (INLA).36 Parliament, however, has not 
29 Hadden, supra note 1, at 2-6; see also 882 ParI. Deb., H.C. (5th SeLl 630 (1974). 
30 See 1989 Act, supra note 2, at pt. I, Proscribed Organizations, § § 1-3 and sched. 1. 
Proscription provisions outlaw membership in paramilitary groups as listed under the 
1989 Act. Similar provisions appeared under the three previous Acts. 1984 Act, supra 
note 2, at pt. I, § § 1-2 and sched. 1; 1976 Act, supra note 2, at pt. I, § § 1-2 and sched. 
1; 1974 Act, supra note 2, at pt. I, § § 1-2 and sched. 1. Each of these proscription 
provisions has outlawed the IRA. In addition, under both the 1984 Act and 1989 Act, 
Parliament outlawed the INLA. 1989 Act, supra note 2, at sched. 1; 1984 Act, supra note 
2, sched. 1. To date, Parliament has not proscribed any Loyalist paramilitary groups 
under the Prevention of Terrorism Acts. Parliament has proscribed both Republican and 
Loyalist paramilitaries under the 1978 Emergency Act, schedule 2 including such Repub-
lican para militaries as the IRA, Cumann na mBan, Fianna na hEireann, and Saor Eire, 
and such Loyalist paramilitaries as the Red Hand Commando, the UFF, and the UVF. 
This proscription, however, only applies to Northern Ireland. 1978 Emergency Act, supra 
note 2, at sched. 2. 
31 1989 Act, supra note 2, at pt. II, Exclusion Orders, § § 4-8; 1984 Act, supra note 2, 
at pt. II, § § 3-9; 1976 Act, supra note 2, at pt. II, § § 3-9; 1974 Act, supra note 2, at pt. 
II, § § 3-6. 
32 1989 Act, supra note 2, at pt. IV, § § 14-16; 1984 Act, supra note 2, at pt. IV, § § 12-
13; 1976 Act, supra note 2, at pt. III, § § 7-8; 1974 Act, supra note 2, at pt. III, § § 7-8. 
33 1989 Act, supra note 2, at pt. IV, § 16, Port and Border Control, sched. 5, Port and 
Border Control, and sched. 6, Designated Ports; 1984 Act, supra note 2, at pt. IV, § 13; 
1976 Act, supra note 2, at pt. III, § 13; 1974 Act, supra note 2, at pt. III, § 8. 
34 See 1989 Act, supra note 2, at pt. I, Proscribed Organizations, § § 1-3 and sched. 1. 
35 REVIEW OF THE OPERATION OF THE PREVENTION OF TERRORISM (TEMPORARY PROVI-
SIONS) ACT 1974 BY THE RT. HON. LORD SHACKLETON, KG, OBE, 1978, CMND. SER. _, 
No. 7324, at 9 (Parliament invited Shackleton to prepare an official review of the 1974 
Act in December 1977) [hereinafter SHACKLETON REPORT]. 
36 See 1974 Act, supra note 2, at pt. I and sched. 1. Compare 1974 Act, supra note 2, at 
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proscribed any Loyalist groups under the four Prevention of 
Terrorism Acts.37 
The second police power-exclusion provisions-limits the free 
movement of suspected terrorists throughout the United King-
dom.38 The provisions authorize Britain's Secretary of State to 
issue orders against those who enter the United Kingdom for 
terrorist purposes or who are or have been concerned in the 
commission of terrorism.39 Such orders prevent the free move-
ment of alleged terrorists into the United Kingdom and between 
Great Britain and Northern Ireland.40 Once issued, individuals 
served with exclusion orders retain the right to challenge the 
orders.41 If the challenge fails, those under orders must comply 
or face potential fines and prison terms.42 
The Parliament-appointed reviewers of the 1974, 1976, and 
1984 Acts agreed that exclusion orders were effective in disrupt-
ing terrorist activities and ridding Great Britain of terrorists.43 
Nevertheless, they also recognized that the success of exclusion 
orders has been at the expense of citizens' rights of free move-
ment; the orders are considered a unique penalty tantamount to 
internal exile.44 While reviewers acknowledged this extraordinary 
result, they concluded that terrorism warrants such extreme 
measures in the interest of public safety.45 
The Prevention of Terrorism Acts' third police power concerns 
terrorist investigations. Each Act has provided police with broad 
powers of arrest and detention.46 Under these provisions, police 
pt. I and sched. 1. with 1989 Act, supra note 2, at pt. I and sched. I, and 1984 Act, supra 
note 2, at pt. I, § § 1-2 and sched. 1. 
37 1989 Act, supra note 2, sched. 1; 1984 Act, supra note 2, at sched. 1; 1976 Act, supra 
note 2, at sched. 1; 1974 Act, supra note 2, at sched. 1. 
38 See 1989 Act, supra note 2, at pt. II, § § 4-8; 1984 Act, supra note 2, at pt. II, § § 3-
9; 1976 Act, supra note 2, at pt. II, § § 3-9; 1974 Act, supra note 2, at pt. II, § § 3-6. 
39 1974 Act, supra note 2, at pt. II, § 3(3)(a); 1989 Act, supra note 2, at pt. II, § 5(1)(a); 
1984 Act, supra note 2, at pt. II, § 4(1)(a); 1976 Act, supra note 2, at pt. II, § 5(1)(a). 
40 1974 Act, supra note 2, at pt. II, § 3(3)(b); 1989 Act, supra note 2, at pt. II, § 5(1)(b); 
1984 Act, supra note 2, at pt. II, § 4(1)(b); 1976 Act, supra note 2, at pt. II, § 5(1)(b). 
41 1974 Act, supra note 2, at pt. II, § 4(1)-(6); 1989 Act, supra note 2, at sched. 2, 3; 
1984 Act, supra note 2, at pt. II, § 7(3)-(8); 1976 Act, supra note 2, at pt. II, § 7(3)-(8). 
42 1989 Act, supra note 2, at pt. II, § 8(4)(a)-(b); 1984 Act, supra note 2, at pt. II, 
§ 9(4)(a)-(b); 1976 Act, supra note 2, at pt. II, § 9(3)(a)-(b); 1974 Act, supra note 2, at pt. 
II, § 3(8)(c)(i)-(ii). 
43 SHACKLETON REPORT, supra note 35, at 39-40; jELLICOE REPORT, supra note 5, at 94; 
COLVILLE REPORT, supra note 9, at 57-58. 
44 See SHACKLETON REPORT, supra note 35, at 11; Bonner, supra note 6, at 452-56. 
4S See SHACKLETON REPORT, supra note 35, at 11. 
46 1989 Act, supra note 2, at pt. IV, § § 14-16; see also 1984 Act, supra note 2, at pt. IV, 
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can arrest suspected terrorists upon reasonable suspicion without 
warrants and detain them up to forty-eight hours without 
chargeY After forty-eight hours, the Secretary of State can ex-
tend this uncharged detention an additional five days. 
In November 1988, plaintiffs successfully challenged these ar-
rest and detention provisions before the European Court of Hu-
man Rights.48 In Brogan v. United Kingdom, four suspected IRA 
and INLA terrorists were arrested under section 12 of the 1984 
Act's arrest provisions and held without charge for between four 
and six days each.49 The Court ruled that because the accused 
were not brought before a judge promptly, their detentions were 
in violation of the Convention on Human Rights. Nevertheless, 
while Britain is a signatory to the convention, it has not imple-
mented the convention in domestic legislation. The Court's de-
cision, therefore, was not binding. 50 In 1989, when Parliament 
reviewed these challenged provisions, it readopted them without 
revision in spite of the Brogan decision, effectively ignoring the 
European Court of Human Right's condemnation of anti-terror-
ist arrest procedures.51 
The fourth power initially adopted under the 1974 Act and 
maintained in subsequent Acts provides police with special im-
migration or "port" powers. Such powers authorize security 
checks on travelers entering and departing Northern Ireland and 
Great Britain. 52 The powers provide that all passenger carriers 
must embark and disembark their passengers at specified ports 
and airports in the United Kingdom.53 Examining officers are 
§ § 12-13; 1976 Act, supra note 2, at pt. III, § § 7-8; 1974 Act, supra note 2, at pt. III, 
§ § 7-8. 
47 See 1989 Act, supra note 2, at pt. IV, § 14(1)-(5). 
48 See Brogan v. United Kingdom, 145-B Eur. Ct. H.R. 117 (ser.A) (1988). The Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights ruled that detentions of four suspected IRA and INLA 
terrorists under pt. IV, § 12 of the 1984 Act violated the European Convention of Human 
Rights. Id. at 135-36; see also Barden, Ministers Detained by Strasbourg Ruling, FORTNIGHT, 
Jan. 1989, at 4. 
49 Brogan, 145-B Eur. Ct. H.R. at 120-22. 
50 145 ParI. Deb., H.C. (6th Ser.) 698 (1989). Tony Marlow, M.P., challenged his 
colleague, Frank Dodson, to establish the binding authority of the European Court of 
Human Rights' ruling in Brogan during debate of the 1989 Act. Id.; see also S. PAISELY, A 
GUIDE TO EEC LAW IN NORTHERN IRELAND 203-06 (1986). 
51 See 1989 Act, supra note 2, at pt. IV, § 14(1)-(5). 
52 1989 Act, supra note 2, at pt. IV, § 16, scheds. 5-6. Compare 1989 Act, supra note 2, 
at pt. IV, § 16, scheds. 5-6 with 1984 Act, supra note 2, at pt. IV, § 13; 1976 Act, supra 
note 2, at pt. III, § 13; and 1974 Act, supra note 2, at pt. III, § 8. 
53 See 1989 Act, supra note 2, at sched. 6. 
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stationed at the borders of the Republic of Ireland and Northern 
Ireland to search baggage and cargo54 and may retain items 
discovered for criminal investigations.55 
Since 1974, Parliament has expanded on its original extraor-
dinary powers. Under the 1976, 1984, and 1989 Acts, Parliament 
adopted additional police powers requiring disclosure of infor-
mation concerning terrorists56 and measures prohibiting terrorist 
fund raisingY 
These information provisions criminalize the failure to disclose 
information which parties knew or believed might assist in pre-
venting terrorism or prosecuting terrorists.58 Potential defen-
dants can assert a "reasonable excuse" defense for the failure to 
disclose. The Act, however, does not define "reasonable excuse."59 
Generally, British criminal case law construes the "reasonable 
excuse" defense as that which a reasonable person would consider 
excuses his or her conduct in a partIcular situation.60 For exam-
ple, where disclosure would result in self-incrimination, the 
Crown Court of Northern Ireland has held that self-incrimination 
qualifies as a "reasonable excuse" under section 15 of the 1967 
Criminal Law Act.61 That court, however, cautioned that self-
incrimination as a "reasonable excuse" ought to be construed 
narrowly and allowed only where there is a genuine risk that the 
54 1989 Act, supra note 2, at sched. 5, 2.; see also 1984 Act, supra note 2, at pt. IV, 
§ 13(1)(a); 1976 Act, supra note 2, at pt. III, § 13(l)(a); 1974 Act, supra note 2, at pt. III, 
§ 8(1)(a). 
55 1989 Act, supra note 2, at sched. 5,4.(4); 1984 Act, supra note 2, at pt. IV, § 13(2)(a)-
(b); 1976 Act, supra note 2, at pt. III, § 13(2)(a)-(b); 1974 Act, supra note 2, at pt. III, 
§ 8(2)(a)-(b). 
56 1989 Act, supra note 2, at pt. III, § 12(1)-(2) and pt. V, § § 17-18. These disclosure 
provisions repeal and replace provisions under the 1984 Act, supra note 2, at pt. III, 
§ II(a)-(b). See also 1976 Act, supra note 2, at pt. III, § II(a)-(b). 
57 1989 Act, supra note 2, at pt. 1, § 2(l)(b), pt. III, § 9, and pt. III, § 11. These 
provisions repeal and replace more limited provisions under the 1984 Act, supra note 2, 
at pt. I, § l(b) and pt. III, § 10. See also 1976 Act, supra note 2, at pt. I, § l(b) and pt. III, 
§ 10; 1974 Act, supra note 2, at pt. I, § 1 (b). 
58 1989 Act, supra note 2, at pt. III, § 12(1)-(2) and pt. V, § § 17-18; see also 1984 Act, 
supra note 2, at pt. III, § 11 (a)-(b); 1976 Act, supra note 2, at pt. III, § II(a)-(b). 
59 See 1989 Act, supra note 2, at pt. III, § 12(3)(b); 1984 Act, supra note 2, at pt. III, 
§ II(b); 1976 Act, supra note 2, at pt. III, § 11(2). 
60 R. v. Butler, [1988] Crim. L.R. 695. 
61 R. v. Donnelly (Apr. 24, 1986) (LEXIS, NI library, Cases file) (Defendant was charged 
under section 5 of the Criminal Law Act, 1967, for withholding information concerning 
concealed explosives on family farm. Northern Ireland's Crown Court allowed the defen-
dant's defense of "reasonable excuse" based on self-incrimination.). 
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information would incriminate the defendants and subject them 
to further prosecution. 
Parliament has encouraged willing and prompt disclosure by 
offering those who disclose limited immunity against prosecution 
for their involvement in criminal activities.62 For example, under 
the financial provisions of the 1989 Act, individuals are not liable 
to prosecution who have knowledge or suspicion of terrorist fi-
nancial activities and disclose or demonstrate that they intended 
to disclose this information to police. Those who remain silent 
are liable for a term of imprisonment or fine or both.63 
According to Earl Jellicoe, the Parliament-appointed reviewer 
of the Prevention of Terrorism Act, 1976 (1976 Act), the infor-
mation provisions were effective in eliciting information from 
reluctant informants.64 He cited the provision as particularly ef-
fective in previously unreported "hijacking" cases where para-
militaries stole automobiles for the commission of terrorist acts. 
Prior to the measures, victims were unwilling to report thefts for 
fear of reprisal. Since their enactment, however, victims faced 
with a choice between criminal penalty or reprisal have seemingly 
chosen to come forward with information. . 
In addition, Parliament stepped up its offensive on illicit fund 
raising. Under the 1974 Act, Parliament only penalized IRA fund 
raising. 65 Thereafter, under the 1976, 1984, and 1989 Acts, Par-
liament extended the fund raising prohibitions to all who solicit, 
receive or make available any money or other property to finance 
acts of terrorism.66 Solicitation offenses are punishable by im-
prisonment or fine or both.67 Additionally, Parliament included 
62 See, e.g., 1989 Act, supra note 2, at pt. III, § 12(2). Section 12(2) provides: 
A person who enters into or is otherwise concerned in any such transaction or 
arrangement as is mentioned in section 9 [Contributions toward acts of terror-
ism], 10 [Contributions to resources of proscribed organizations] or 11 [Assisting 
in retention or control of terrorist funds] does not commit an offence under this 
section if he is acting with the express consent of a constable or if -
(a) he discloses to a constable his suspicion or belief ... and 
(b) the disclosure is made after he enters into or otherwise becomes concerned 
in the transaction or arrangement in question but is made on his own 
initiative .... 
63 1989 Act, supra note 2, at pt. III, § 13. 
64 JELLICOE REPORT, supra note 5, at 85. 
65 1974 Act, supra note 2, at pt. I, § l(b). 
66 Compare 1974 Act, supra note 2, at pt. I, § 1(b) with 1989 Act, supra note 2, at pt. III, 
§ 9; 1984 Act, supra note 2, at pt. III, § 10; and 1976 Act, supra note 2, at pt. III, § 10. 
67 1989 Act, supra note 2, at pt. III, § 13(l)(a); 1984 Act, supra note 2, at pt. III, 
§ 10(3)(a)-(b); 1976 Act, supra note 2, at pt. III, § 10(3)(a)-(b); 1974 Act, supra note 2, at 
pt. I, § 1 (c)(i)-(ii). 
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"forfeiture" proceedings under the 1976, 1984, and 1989 Acts 
that authorize courts to seize money and property held by those 
convicted of solicitation offenses.68 Northern Irish and Scottish 
prosecutors have used these provisions to proceed against Scottish 
weapons dealers and Northern Irish sympathizers who store pros-
cribed firearms, munitions, and explosives.6g 
C. Terrorist Fund Raising, Racketeering, and Money Laundering 
The official reviewers of the 1976 and 1984 Acts, Earl J ellicoe 
and Lord Colville, noted that Loyalist and Republican paramili-
taries not only seek support through contributions, but also 
through extortion, racketeering, and fraud. 70 These illicit reve-
nue-raising activities have continued notwithstanding the intro-
duction of the solicitations offense under the 1976 Act. Northern 
Irish para militaries have extorted protection money from public 
house owners, building contractors, and retailers. 71 They have 
also raised funds from paramilitary-sponsored smuggling, kid-
napping, and gambling operations. 72 Recent reports note that 
Northern Irish paramilitaries have taken direct control of legiti-
mate services and businesses. In addition, both Loyalist and Re-
publican paramilitaries have been implicated in European Eco-
nomic Community subsidy and British Inland Revenue fraud. 
Former Home Secretary Douglas Hurd estimates the IRA's 
annual earnings between £3,000,000-£4,000,000. 73 Protestant 
Loyalist opposition such as the Ulster Defense Association (UDA) 
68 1989 Act, supra note 2, at sched. 4; 1984 Act, supra note 2, at pt. III, § 10(4)(a)-(b); 
1976 Act, supra note 2, at pt. III, § 1O(4)(a)-(b). 
69 See Murray v. Ministry of Defence, [I988J 1 W.L.R, 692 (discussion of section 10 
contributions offense under the 1984 Act); Sayers v. HM Advocate, 1982 J .C. 17 (discus-
sion of section 10 contributions offense under 1984 Act). 
70 JELLICOE REPORT, supra note 5, at 82; COLVILLE REPORT, supra note 9, at 47-49. 
71 Protestant Paramilitaries Better Armed than Ever, Reuters, Apr. 23, 1989; Vallely & 
Dettmer, Extortion Rackets Widespread in Ulster, The Times (London), Sept. 21, 1988, at 2, 
col. 2; Evans & Webster, Hurd Declares War Against Racketeers Who Back IRA, The Times 
(London), Sept. 21, 1988, at I, col. 7; Britain Aims to Choke off Ulster Guerrilla Funds, 
Reuters, Sept. 20, 1988; Hunter, Irish Racket Law, 138 NEW L.J. 718 (1988); Hunter, Ulster 
Legal Changes, 138 NEW L.J. 625 (1988); Moseley, Lone Stand Against Racketeers, Chi. Trib., 
Feb. 16, 1988, at 16, col. 1; Moseley, Racketeers Hold Ulster in Terror, Chi. Trib., Feb. 15, 
1988, at 1, col. 6; Moseley, Mafia-like Rackets Fund Ulster Groups, Chi. Trib., Feb. 15, 1988, 
at 1, col. l. See generally J. ADAMS, supra note 13, at 156-84; Bonner, supra note 6, at 457-
58. 
72 Bonner, supra note 6, at 457-58. 
73 Vallely and Dettmer, Extortion Rackets Widespread in Ulster, The Times (London), Sept. 
21,1988, at 2, col. b; 143 ParI. Deb., H.C. (6th Ser.) 212 (1989). 
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earn substantially less: approximately £2,000,000 annually from 
protection money and legal drinking establishments. Sources es-
timate that combined paramilitary income ranges between 
£18,000,000-£55,000,000.74 These funds subsidize acts of terror-
ism, terrorist cells abroad, and dependents of jailed terrorists. 75 
In order to maintain steady cash flow, Loyalist and Republican 
paramilitaries have gone so far as to divide up territories in 
Northern Ireland between themselves and to cooperate in en-
forcing threats against reluctant "contributors."76 Once collected, 
terrorist funds are "laundered" through businesses or financial 
institutions.77 The intent is to obscure the illegal source and des-
tination of the funds from police investigations and government 
prosecutions. 
Two recent examples of IRA money laundering illustrate the 
elaborate schemes employed in the United Kingdom and abroad 
to thwart British and Northern Irish police in their investigations. 
Moreover, these examples demonstrate the role of third parties 
who knowingly or unwittingly assist Northern Irish paramilitaries 
in laundering their funds. The first example involves the collapse 
of a cross-border currency exchange business which laundered 
money for the IRA.78 The exchange operator offered higher 
rates than local banks in the exchange of Irish and British 
pounds. The IRA participated in the exchange system through 
individual smugglers and legitimate businessmen. Once the IRA's 
tainted funds were exchanged for clean currency, the funds were 
successfully laundered and beyond detection of police. 
The second example illustrates the role of third parties in 
assisting paramilitaries in international money transfers.79 In 
Clancy and McCarthy v. Ireland, officials from the Republic of 
Ireland seized £1,700,000 in alleged IRA funds deposited under 
the name of an Irish-American millionaire, Alan Clancy. The 
74 Moseley, Lone Stand Against Racketeers, Chi. Trib., Feb. 15, 1988, at 16, col. 1. 
75 Id. See also Moseley, Racketeers Hold Ulster in Terror, Chi. Trib., Feb. 15, 1988, at 1, 
col. 6; Mafia-like Rackets Fund Ulster Groups, Chi. Trib., Feb. 14, 1988, at 1, col. 1. 
76 Clarke, Rival Groups "Held Terror Summit," The Times (London), Jan. 1, 1988, at A7, 
col. a; Bonner, supra note 6, at 457-58. 
77 504 ParI. Deb., H.L. (5th Ser.) 30 (1989). 
78 Dettmer, Business Crash May Have Lost IRA Cash, The Times (London), Oct. 6, 1988, 
at 2, col. 2. 
79 Clancy and McCarthy v. Ireland, [1989] l.R.L.M. 670 (the Republic of Ireland's 
Dublin High Court upholds seizure of funds); J. Hunter, Irish Racket Law, 138 NEW L.J. 
718 (1988). 
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funds were the remainder of a £2,000,000 ransom paid to the 
IRA and were seized by officials of the Republic of Ireland pur-
suant to anti-terrorist legislation. The IRA had transferred the 
ransom to a Swiss Bank account, then forwarded it to Clancy's 
account in a New York branch of the Bank of Ireland, and finally, 
redeposited the ransom money in the Navan branch of the Bank 
of Ireland in the Republic of Ireland. Clancy's involvement and 
the assistance of Swiss and Irish banks in transferring the IRA 
ransom money funds demonstrates that money laundering de-
pends on the support of sympathizers and the participation of 
third parties such as banks to obscure the source of the funds 
and their ultimate destinations. 
D. Drug Trafficking Model 
Until 1989, Parliament had not enacted any terrorist money 
laundering legislation. Instead, it addressed money laundering 
only in the context of drug trafficking under the Drug Traffick-
ing Offences Act, 1986 (Drug Act).80 Parliament has referred to 
the Drug Act's provisions as a model for the 1989 Act's money 
laundering measures.8! The Drug Act's provisions were the first 
to criminalize a third party's handling of drug trafficking pro-
ceeds.82 They also provide prosecutors, upon court application, 
with orders for the production of materials relevant to drug 
investigations and the confiscation of drug trafficking proceeds 
and property.83 
To strip traffickers of their profits, government prosecutors 
must first establish a prima facie case of money laundering. Un-
80 Drug Act, supra note 14, at § 24. 
81 143 ParI. Deb., H.C. (6th Ser.) 213 (1986) (former Home Secretary Hurd's remarks 
concerning the 1989 Act and Drug Act); 504 ParI. Deb., H.L. (5th Ser.) 957-66 (1989) 
(Lord Mishcon's comparison of the 1989 Act and Drug Act). 
82 Drug Act, supra note 14, at § 24. Section 24 provides, in pertinent part, that: 
(I) if a person enters into or is otherwise concerned in an arrangement whereby 
(a) the retention or control by or on behalf of another['s) ... proceeds of drug 
trafficking is facilitated (whether by concealment, removal from the jurisdiction, 
transfer to nominees or otherwise), or 
(b) [the) proceeds of drug trafficking-
(i) are used to secure that funds are placed at [the trafficker's) disposal, or 
(ii) are used for [the trafficker's) benefit to acquire property by way of investment, 
knowing or suspecting that [the trafficker) is a person who carries on or has 
carried on drug trafficking, he is guilty of an offence. 
See also A New Kind of Traffic, 137 NEW L.J. 29-30 (1987); Hiley, The Drug Trafficking 
Offences Act 1986, 84 LAW SOC'y GAZ. 3557 (1987) (application of the Drug Act). 
83 Drug Act, supra note 14, at § § 27-28. 
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der section 24 of the Drug Act, prosecutors must establish specific 
conduct and intent. According to section 24, the requisite criminal 
conduct is assisting a drug trafficker's attempts to conceal, trans-
fer, dispose or otherwise arrange drug proceeds for the traffick-
ers' use or benefit.84 Knowledge or mere suspicion of the possible 
drug trafficking source of funds satisfies the intent requirement. 85 
The intent standard here is subjective and is based on a banker's 
or other third party's actual knowledge or suspicion. 
Defenses to the money laundering offense under the Drug Act 
include failure to satisfy any of the elements of the offense or 
"reasonable excuse."86 If, for example, parties are unaware that 
they are or may be dealing with drug traffickers, they lack the 
requisite intent under section 24 to commit the offense.87 In 
addition, parties can avoid liability under the Drug Act by dis-
closing to authorities their involvement with traffickers.88 Even if 
the parties fail to disclose, they can assert that they intended to 
disclose to police their suspicions or beliefs but had a "reasonable 
excuse" barring their disclosure. 89 If these defenses fail and par-
ties are convicted under the Drug Act, they face imprisonment 
or fines or both.90 
In addition to prosecution, the Drug Act requires those who 
possess relevant materials regarding drug trafficking investiga-
tions to produce such materials.91 The Drug Act empowers circuit 
judges to issue production orders to those who possess material 
relevant to drug trafficking investigations. For example, British 
excise officials have used the production orders to compel the 
London branch of Luxembourg's Credit and Commerce Inter-
national SA to hand over all documents relating to accounts held 
in the names of Manuel Noriega and members of his family.92 
British police have also used the orders to compel solicitors of a 
suspected drug trafficker to produce documents regarding prop-
84 [d. at § 24(l)(a)-(b). 
85 [d. at § 24(l)(b). 
86 [d. at § 24(4). 
87 !d. at § 24(4)(a). 
88 [d. at § 24(4)(c). 
89 See supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text. 
90 Drug Act, supra note 14, at § 24(5). 
91 [d. at § 27. 
92 R. v. Crown at Southwark, ex parte Customs and Excise Commissioners; R. v. Crown 
Court at Southwark, ex parte Bank of Credit and Commerce International SA, [1989] 3 
All E.R. 673. 
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erty purchases made with trafficking proceeds.93 Although the 
solicitors claimed the documents were protected by attorney-
client privilege, the House of Lords ruled that the documents, 
while innocently held by the solicitors, were not subject to legal 
professional privilege and had to be produced. 
E. Confidentiality Law 
The production orders under section 27 of the Drug Act per-
mit bankers to divulge customer information in apparent breach 
of their common law duty of confidentiality.94 This duty of con-
fidentiality requires that bankers refrain from disclosing customer 
information to protect customers' reputations and creditworthi-
ness. For example, in Tournier v. National Provincial and Union 
Bank of England, the court ruled that the bank breached its duty 
to its customer when it disclosed to the customer's employer that 
the plaintiff had issued checks to a bookmaker.95 In his opinion, 
Judge Banks listed four exceptions to a banker's duty of confi-
dentiality: (1) where disclosure is under compulsion by law; (2) 
where there is a duty to the public to disclose; (3) where the 
interests of the bank require disclosure; and (4) where the disclo-
sure is made by express or implied consent of the customer.96 
The first and second exceptions have been the source of con-
siderable litigation since Tournier. Under the first exception, 
banks are empowered to breach their duty of confidentiality un-
der compulsion of statute. Currently, twenty-two statutes, includ-
ing both the Drug Act and 1989 Act authorize disclosure.97 More 
93 Francis & Francis v. Central Criminal Court, (1988) 3 All E.R. 775. 
94 See Tournier v. Nat'l Provincial & Union Bank, [1924) 1 K.B. 461; see also 3(1) 
HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND ~ 240 (4th ed. Reissue 1973). Commentators have described 
the duty of confidentiality as: 
an implied term of the contract between a banker and his customer that the 
banker will not divulge to a third person, without the express or implied consent 
of the customer, either the state of the customer's account, or any of his trans-
actions with the bank or any information relating to the customer acquired 
through the keeping of his account, unless the banker is compelled to do so by 
order of a court, or the circumstances give rise to a public duty of disclosure or 
the protection of the banker's own interest requires it. 
See also Newcomb, United States Litigation and Foreign Bank Secrecy: The Origins of Conflict, 
9 N.Y.L.]. INT'L & COMPo L. 47 (1988); Neate, et aI., Banking Secrecy Financial Privacy and 
Related Restrictions, 7 INT'L Bus. LAW. 259, 263-71 (1979). 
95 Tournier, [1924) I K.B. 461, [1924) T.L.R. 214. 
96 Tournier, (1924) T.L.R., at 217. 
97 BANKING SERVICES: LAW AND PRACTICE REPORTED BY THE REVIEW COMMITTEE, 1989 
CMND. SER. _No. 621, at 30 and Appendix Q [hereinafter JACK REPORT); see also Hallpike, 
87 LAW SOC'Y GAZ. 25, July 4, 1990. 
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recently, courts have held that banks are obliged to comply with 
statutory disclosure requirements and do not breach their duty 
of confidentiality when they act in compliance.98 They have also 
concluded that banks are under no obligation to probe disclosed 
information or to inform customers of disclosures. It reasoned 
that notice to customers who are under police investigation would 
only frustrate the investigations. 
Beyond the banking context, British courts have applied the 
second Tournier exception to permit breaches of confidentiality 
where public safety or national security require it.99 Courts apply 
a balancing test in these cases to determine whether public inter-
est outweighs confidentiality.lOo Factors courts consider include: 
whether the risk to the public is real, immediate and serious; 
whether the risk will be substantially reduced by disclosure; 
whether the disclosure is no greater than is reasonably necessary 
to minimize the risk; and whether the consequent damage to the 
public interest regarding the duty of confidentiality is outweighed 
by the public interest in minimizing the risk. 101 British courts 
have extended this analysis to find disclosure admissible where a 
psychiatrist released a report to government officials concerning 
a convicted mass murderer's continuing violent behavior. The 
court ruled on the psychiatrist's behalf, finding full disclosure 
necessary for the public's safety. Conversely, courts have ruled 
against disclosure where the countervailing risk to individuals has 
been greater than that to the community.102 
British courts have been particularly willing to allow breaches 
of the duty where nondisclosure would aid in the commission of 
a wrong. 103 For example, where parties are innocently involved 
in a tortious act, British courts have ruled that parties are under 
98 Barclays Bank pic (Trading as Barclaycard) v. Taylor, [1989) 3 W.L.R. 1066; The 
Times (London), May 23, 1989, at 54, col. e. 
99 The Tournier exceptions to a bank's, or more generally, a fiduciary's duty of confi-
dentiality have been applied in other contexts. See, e.g., Xv. Y, [1988) 1 All E.R. 648 
(newspaper may not disclose that doctors carry the AIDS virus on public policy grounds); 
A-G v. Guardian Newspapers, [1988) 3 W.L.R. 766 (ex-intelligence officer prohibited 
from publishing top secret information on public policy grounds). 
100 See X v. Y, [1988) 1 All E.R. 648 (balancing test applied to case where doctors 
infected with the AIDS virus continued practicing without disclosing their illnesses). 
101 W v. Edgell, [1989) 1 All E.R. 835. 
102 In re M & N, [1989)3 W.L.R. 1136. 
103 Norwich Pharmacal Co. v. Customs and Excise Comm'r, [1972)3 W.L.R. 864 (British 
customs authorities may disclose list of importers who pirate patent holder's drug for civil 
action against importers). 
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a duty to assist the party harmed by giving full information and 
disclosing the identity of the wrongdoers. 104 This duty to disclose 
has been deemed the "defense of iniquity" which, narrowly stated, 
predicates that innocent parties cannot be made confidants of 
crimes or frauds. l05 In light of the case law, bankers must take 
into account their duty of confidentiality, exceptions to that duty, 
and common law qualifications to those exceptions. 
With so many statutory exceptions and common law qualifica-
tions, Parliament appointed a review committee on banking ser-
vices law in January 1987 (the Jack Committee) to consider 
streamlining the current state of confidentiality law. l06 The Jack 
Committee concluded that disclosure under compulsion of statute 
as under the first Tourrtier exception should be codified while 
disclosure for public purposes under the second Tourrtier excep-
tion ought to be abolished. 107 The Committee viewed the public 
purposes exception as overly vague and burdensome; it did not 
"provide the measure of certainty" which bankers need in deter-
mining whether they are released from their duty of confiden-
tiality.los Conversely, statutes generally provide such certainty. In 
addition, the Jack Committee viewed the "defense of iniquity" as 
a necessary exception to confidentiality and supported disclosure 
when banks are parties to legal actions. It concluded that confu-
sion would increase unless Parliament revised confidentiality 
law. 109 
II. THE 1989 ACT 
In 1989, Parliament finally turned its attention to the financing 
of terrorism and introduced new measures under the Prevention 
of Terrorism Act that criminalize third-party assistance in the 
retention or control of terrorist funds. 110 The provisions were 
104 Id. at 877. 
105 Guardian Newspapers, [1988] 3 W.L.R. 776, 794. 
106 JACK REpORT, supra note 97, at 1-5. 
107 Id. at 37. 
108 Id. at 35. 
109 Id. at 34-35. The Jack Committee explained that current trends in computerized 
banking would further erode the duty, making personal account information a tempting 
target for governmental investigatory agencies. Id. at 30. 
110 1989 Act, supra note 2, at pt. III, § II. 
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adopted in March 22, 1989 against the statutory background of 
the Drug Act and the continuing political crisis in Northern Ire-
land. Debate over the 1989 Act's adoption focused on the general 
effectiveness of the prior Prevention of Terrorism Acts and the 
effect of such extraordinary, emergency legislation on human 
rights. lll 
The provisions of the 1989 Act share features in common with 
their predecessors. 112 The current Act, however, finally addresses 
terrorist money laundering. Measures include a money launder-
ing offense, revised disclosure provisions, procedural safeguards, 
and forfeiture orders.113 
The elements of a prima facie money laundering offense under 
section 11 of the 1989 Act include both proscribed conduct and 
specific intent. 114 Individuals are guilty of a section 11 offense if 
they enter into or are concerned with an arrangement to facilitate 
the retention or control of terrorist funds. In addition, prosecu-
tors must establish that offenders possessed the requisite intent 
for the offense: offenders must know or have "reasonable cause 
to suspect" that the financial transaction related to terrorist funds. 
Section 11 provides an objective intent standard. It requires triers 
of fact to decide what ordinary persons in similar circumstances 
would do rather than what individual defendants would do given 
their particular circumstances. ll5 Thus, merely negligent third 
parties who inadvertently handle terrorist funds may be offend-
ers.116 
This standard is an onerous burden on section 11 defendants. 
For example, the defense of lack of intent under the section 
requires defendants to establish that they "did not know and had 
no reasonable cause to suspect" that they were involved in ter-
rorist transactions. Thus, potential defendants have the burden 
of establishing a negative defense.ll7 Earl Ferrers, during debates 
III See Brogan v. United Kingdom, 145-B Eur. Ct. H.R. 117, 135-36 (ser. A) (1988); 
143 ParI. Deb., H.C. (6th Ser.) 208-14, 238-42, and 249-50 (1989); 145 ParI. Deb., H.C. 
(6th Ser.) 694-736 (1989). 
112 See supra notes 30-33, 56-57 and accompanying text. 
113 1989 Act, supra note 2, at pt. III, § § 11-13, pt. IV, and pt. V. 
114 Id. at § 11(1)-(2). 
115 Id. But see Drug Act, supra note 14, at § 24. 
116 1989 Act, supra note 2, at pt. III, § § 11(1)-(2). 
117 Id. at pt. III, § 11(2). Section 11(2) provides: 
In proceedings against a person for an offence under this section it is a defence 
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before the House of Lords, explained that while the standard 
was burdensome, it was justified on public policy grounds and 
was consistent with current banking policy. I IS He assured his 
colleagues that it would be "relatively easy for [a] defendant, if 
he is innocent, to show that he had no reason to know or suspect 
that he was caught in an arrangement which was benefiting ter-
rorists."1l9 The burden upon defendants is to establish in a "bal-
ance of probabilities" or by a preponderance of the evidence that 
they had no reasonable cause to suspect that they were arranging 
transactions for terrorists. 120 As an additional defense, defendants 
can assert duress, duress of circumstances, or necessity. 121 Barring 
a successful defense, handlers of terrorist funds face prison sen-
tences of up to fourteen years. 122 
Section 12 of the 1989 Act provides additional exemptions 
from criminal prosecution.123 Potential defendants can argue that 
to prove that he did not know and had no reasonable cause to suspect that the 
arrangement related to terrorist funds. 
118 504 ParI. Deb., H.L. (5th Ser.) 960-65 (1989). In Ferrers' introduction, he explained 
that section 11 's intent standard differed from that of both the section 9 "solicitations" 
offense of the 1984 Act, and section 24 of the Drug Act. He justified the difference on 
the grounds that terrorism is even more dangerous to the United Kingdom than drug 
trafficking, and the "reasonable suspicion" standard under section 11 is consistent with 
banking practices. 
119 Id. at 960. Ferrers concluded: 
With regard to the burden of proof ... , I realize that the ... section 11 offence 
is different .... The offence here is not that money is being made available to 
the terrorist which is outlawed under section 9, but is being looked after for him. 
We commonly use the expression laundering to describe this sort of activity .... 
This is bound to create difficulties for the prosecution in proving that the 
defendant knew or that he had reasonable cause to suspect that the arrangement 
related to terrorist funds. But it will be relatively easy for a defendant, if he is 
innocent, to show that he had no reason to know or suspect that he was caught 
up in an arrangement which was benefiting terrorists. 
120 504 ParI. Deb., H.L. (5th Ser.) 962 (1989). 
121 Bonner, supra note 6, at 460. 
122 1989 Act, supra note 2, at pt. III, § 13. 
123 Id. at pt. III, § 12. Section 12, Disclosure of Information about terrorist funds, 
provides: 
(1) A person may notwithstanding any restriction on the disclosure of information 
imposed by contract disclose to a constable a suspicion or belief that any money 
or other property is or is derived from terrorist funds or any matter on which 
such a suspicion or belief is based. 
(2) A person who enters into or is otherwise concerned in any such transaction 
or arrangement as is mentioned in § 9, § 10 or § 11 above does not commit an 
offence under that section if he is acting with the express consent of a constable 
or if-
(a) he discloses to a constable his suspicion or belief that the money or other 
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they intended to disclose to police their suspicions or beliefs that 
certain of the financial arrangements they were involved in were 
related to terrorist funds. The defendants must also show that 
they disclosed information at their own initiative within a reason-
able time. Barring disclosure, the defendants may also establish 
a "reasonable excuse" for their failure to disclose. 
Section 12 also includes a modified disclosure standard in ad-
dition to its exemptions. 124 Unlike similar provisions under the 
1976 and 1984 Acts, section 12 of the 1989 Act specifically ad-
dresses the money laundering offense of section 11.125 The pro-
visions stipulate that parties who have knowledge or suspicion 
that money or other property is derived from terrorist funds 
must disclose such information notwithstanding any contracted 
restrictions on disclosure.126 This provision empowers banks and 
bankers to breach their duty of confidentiality. If the knowledge-
able parties do not disclose, fail to establish the intent to disclose, 
or provide no reasonable excuse for their failure to disclose, 
money handlers face imprisonment and fines under a section 11 
conviction. 127 
Additional disclosure provisions are set out under sections 17 
and 18 of the 1989 Act. 128 Section 18 reiterates the original pro-
visions of the 1976 and 1984 Acts which criminalized the failure 
to disclose information concerning the prevention of terrorist 
acts. 129 Section 17, however, sets forth a new offense for wrongful 
disclosures.13o Under section 17, individuals are guilty of an of-
property concerned is or is derived from terrorist funds or any matter on which 
such a suspicion or belief is based; and 
(b) the disclosure is made after he enters into or otherwise becomes concerned 
in the transaction or arrangement in question but is made on his own initiative 
and as soon as it is reasonable for him to make it. 
(3) In proceedings against a person for an offence under ... § II above it is a 
defence to prove -
(a) that he intended to disclose to a constable such a suspicion, belief or matter 
as is mentioned in paragraph (a) of subsection (2) above; and 
(b) that there is a reasonable excuse for his failure to make the disclosure as 
mentioned in paragraph (b) of the subsection. 
12< 1989 Act, supra note 2, at pt. III, § 12. 
125 Compare 1989 Act, supra note 2, at pt. III, § 12(1) with 1984 Act, supra note 2, pt. 
III, § 11 and 1976 Act, supra note 2, at pt. III, § .11. 
126 1989 Act, supra note 2, at pt. III, § 12(1). 
127 [d. at pt. III, § 13. 
128 [d. at pt. V, § § 17-18. 
129 [d. at pt. V, § 18(1)(a)-(b). 
130 [d. at pt. V, § 17. Section 17(2) provides, in pertinent part: 
Where in relation to a terrorist investigation a warrant or order under Schedule 
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fense if they know or have reasonable cause to suspect that a 
terrorist investigation is taking place, and make disclosures which 
are likely to prejudice the investigation, 13l The section defines 
"terrorist investigations" to include investigations into terrorist 
money laundering,I32 In this context, prejudicial disclosures may 
include misleading disclosures which obstruct such investigations 
or information which places investigators at personal risk. I33 
Those who make wrongful disclosures may raise such defenses 
as lack of knowledge or "reasonable excuse."134 They may also 
assert that they had "lawful authority" to disclose the information, 
notwithstanding any possible effects. 
Penalties and procedures for the financial assistance of terror-
ism are provided under schedule 4 and section 13 of the 1989 
AcL I35 Schedule 4 authorizes courts to issue restraint orders, 
freezing a section 11 defendants' assets and prohibiting their 
destruction or removal from the court's jurisdiction. 136 Upon con-
viction, section 13 provides for imprisonment and fines and au-
thorizes forfeiture proceedings against funds which are in the 
possession of convicted parties and intended for terrorist pur-
poses.1 37 During the forfeiture proceedings, courts will entertain 
third party claims to money or title to property subject to forfei-
ture. I38 Home Secretary Hurd, in presenting these provisions to 
the House of Commons, noted that the government would ne-
gotiate mutual enforcement agreements with other countries in 
7 of this Act has been issued or made or has been applied for and not refused, 
a person is guilty of an offence if, knowing or having reasonable cause to suspect 
that the investigation is taking place, he ... makes any disclosure which is likely 
to prejudice the investigation .... 
In addition, section 17(2)(b) addresses offenses for the falsification, concealment, destruc-
tion, or disposal of material which is relevant to an investigation. 
131 Id. at § 17(5). 
Il2 Id. at § 17(l)(a)(ii). 
133 Cf 1989 Act, supra note 2, at sched. 7, 8.(2). While section 17 of the 1989 Act does 
not define prejudicial disclosures, other provisions suggest circumstances in which disclo-
sure would be prejudicial. For example, in schedule 7, the Act allows special warrant 
application procedures where disclosures to obtain warrants would "prejudice the capa-
bility of members of the Royal Ulster Constabulary [RUC] in relation to the investigation 
... or otherwise prejudice [their] safety or ... [the safety of] persons, in Northern 
Ireland." 
134 1989 Act, supra note 2, at pt. V, § 17(3)(a)-(b). 
135 Id. at pt. III, § 13. 
136 Id. at sched. 4, 3.(1). 
137 Id. at sched. 4, l.(a) and pt. III, § 13(2)-(3). 
138 Id. at pt. III, § 13(6). 
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an effort to harmonize restraining orders and forfeiture pro-
ceedings. 139 
In addition to potential penalties, the 1989 Act provides pro-
cedural safeguards for those charged under section 11. 140 First, 
prosecution is wholly discretionary: under section 19 of the 1989 
Act, the government may waive prosecution. Criteria for waiving 
prosecution, however, have not been established. 141 Secondly, 
if one is accused but not convicted under section 11, the inno-
cent party has a limited cause of action for compensation. 142 The 
party must prove that "some serious default" was committed 
by authorities in their investigations. 143 In addition, the 
party must demonstrate that he or she suffered loss related 
to the investigation. Awards are left to the discretion of the 
court. 
As of September 1990, the British courts had not convicted 
anyone under section 11, but potential defendants, and particu-
larly bankers, have already voiced their opposition to the mea-
sures. 144 They contest the "reasonable person" objective intent 
standard. According to critics in the banking community, the 
standard implicates innocent bankers and loan officers for the 
mere handling of what they assume are "clean" funds. 145 Critics 
also point out that under no other criminal statute must defen-
dants bear so heavy a burden to establish their innocence. For 
example, bankers must prove the negative defense that bank 
139 143 ParI. Deb., H.C. (6th Ser.) 214 (l989). 
140 1989 Act, supra note 2, at pt. V, § 19. 
141 [d.; see also Bonner, supra note 6, at 460. Bonner explains: 
Given the extent to which terrorist organisations in Northern Ireland are inter-
locked with the socio-economic life of the parts of the community, it is clear that 
the offences [under the 1989 Act] may embrace a much wider range of people 
than the traditional banking or financial community .... Sensitive use of the 
Attorney-General's role in sanctioning prosecutions will be necessary if these 
offences are not to prove oppressive in penalising those merely indulging in the 
normal social intercourse. 
142 1989 Act, supra note 2, at sched. 4, 7. 
143 [d. at sched. 4, 7.(2). 
144 Wheatley, Guilty . .. Said the Red Queen, 139 NEW L.J. 499-500 (l989). 
145 504 ParI. Deb., H.L. (5th Ser.) 966 (1989). Lord Mishcon explained: 
The banks in this country ... do not consist of criminals; nor do they consist of 
bank clerks who are as wise as the Noble Lord [Earl Ferrers] .... What are they 
supposed to do under the provision ... ? A perfectly respectable bank clerk is 
to be told[:] "[Y]ou go into the witness box. You allowed this arrangement to 
take place. You prove to the satisfaction of the jury that you did not know or 
did not have reasonable cause to suspect." 
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employees "did not know and had no reasonable cause to suspect" 
that they were involved in terrorist transactions. 146 Finally, bank-
ers object to the state of confidentiality and disclosure law and 
are concerned with their conflicting disclosure duties. 147 
III. THE U.S. REGULATORY ALTERNATIVE: THE BANKING 
SECRECY ACT 
As Lord Harris noted during the Drug Act and 1989 Act 
debates, U.S. federal law offers an alternative to the British 
money laundering approach. 148 The difference is apparent in the 
law's methodology and its substantive provisions. Whereas the 
1989 Act focuses on prosecution of potentially unwitting bankers, 
the U.S. alternative, the Banking Secrecy Act (BSA), provides a 
uniform filing procedure applied equally to all parties subject to 
the Act's provisions. 149 To enforce compliance, the BSA provides 
concise banking regulations, criminal penalties, and civil causes 
of action.150 It requires banks to file standardized transaction 
reports with the IRS and to retain reports on customer cash 
transactions. 
The underlying policy of the BSA is cited in the Act's "Decla-
ration of Purpose" which committed the Act "to require certain 
reports or records where they have a high degree of usefulness 
146 [d. at 499; Bonner, supra note 6, at 462. 
147 See JACK REPORT, supra note 97, at 30; 1989 Act, supra note 2, at pt. III, § 12 and 
pt. V, § 17. 
148 504 ParI. Deb., H.L. (5th Ser.) 24 (1989); 472 ParI. Deb., H.L. (5th Ser.) 118-22 
(1986). 
149 31 U.S.C. § § 5311-26 (1989). Section 5313 prescribes the following reporting 
procedures: 
(a) When a domestic financial institution is involved in a transaction for the 
payment, receipt, or transfer of United States coins or currency (or other mon-
etary instruments the Secretary of the Treasury prescribes), in amount, denom-
ination, or amount and denomination, or under circumstances the Secretary 
prescribes by regulation, the institution and any other participant in the trans-
action the Secretary may prescribe shall file a report on the transaction at the 
time and in the way the Secretary prescribes. A participant acting for another 
person shall make the report as the agent or bailee of the person and identify 
the person for whom the transaction is being made. 
(b) The Secretary may designate a domestic financial institution as an agent of 
the United States Government to receive a report under this section .... 
150 [d. (Reports on domestic coins and currency transactions); 31 U.S.C. § 5314 (Records 
and reports on foreign financial agency transactions); 31 U.S.C. § 5315 (Reports on 
foreign currency transactions); 31 U.S.C. § 5316 (Reports on exporting and importing 
monetary instruments); 31 U.S.c. § 5321 (Civil Penalties, Injunctions); 31 U.S.C. § 5322 
(Criminal Penalties). 
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in criminal, tax, or regulatory investigations or proceedings."151 
Congressional hearings prior to the BSA's enactment noted that 
the Act was drafted to facilitate the gathering of information on 
the banking transactions of petty criminals, organized crime fig-
ures, and income tax evaders who utilize financial institutions to 
carry out their illegal activities. 152 Congressional representatives 
recognized that criminals deal in cash or its equivalents because 
it is freely exchangeable and difficult to trace. 153 They concluded 
that deposits and withdrawals of large sums of currency may 
betray criminal activities. 154 
Law enforcement representatives also urged Congress to enact 
legislation which would require banks to maintain records "in a 
manner designed to facilitate criminal, tax, and regulatory inves-
tigations" of national and international cash transactions. Accord-
ing to congressional findings, costs of implementing such regu-
lations would be minimal. The Act, generally viewed as an 
effective and inexpensive means to address criminal financing, 
was passed in 1970. 
The BSA establishes reporting and recording requirements for 
domestic financial institutions involved in transactions for the 
payment, receipt, or transfer of U.S. coins or currency.155 Finan-
cial institutions are defined as commercial, investment, private, 
or foreign banks operating in the United States, trust companies, 
currency exchanges, and brokers or dealers in securities or com-
modities. 156 
Once an individual or institution qualifies as a domestic finan-
cial institution, it must complete Cash Transaction Reports 
(CTRs) when involved in domestic transactions of coin or cur-
rency.157 Implementing regulations detail this requirement and 
mandate that each institution file CTRs describing the transaction 
with the IRS for each deposit, withdrawal, or exchange of cur-
rency in excess of $10,000. 158 Institutions must also record and 
151 31 U.S.C. § 5311. 
152 H.R. REP. No. 91-975, 91sT CONG., 2d Sess., _, reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE CONGo 
& ADMIN., 4394, 4395. 
153 Rusch, Hue and Cry in the Counting-House: Some Observations on the Bank Secrecy Act, 
37 CATH. U.L. REv. 465 (1988). 
154 H.R. REP. No. 91-975, 91sT CONG., 2d Sess., _, reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE CONGo 
& ADMIN., 4394, 4396. 
155 31 U.S.C. § § 5311-5326. 
156 31 U.S.C. § 5312; 31 C.F.R. § 103.11(i) (1990). 
157 31 U.S.C. § 5313. 
158 31 C.F.R. § 103.22(a)(I) (1990). 
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retain the name, address, and social security or tax identification 
number of those who transact above the BSA's limits.159 Banks, 
in particular, must retain records detailing any extension of 
credit, transfer of funds, opening of an account, or sale or re-
demption of a certificate of deposit in excess of the BSA's limits.160 
Finally, the CTRs must be filed with the IRS within fifteen days 
following the cash transactions. 161 
Prior to the adoption of amendments to the BSA in 1987, 
money launderers had been successful in "structuring" their 
transactions to evade the BSA's reporting requirements. 162 Fre-
quently, launderers employed couriers known as "smurfs" who 
would make deposits or convert cash into cashier checks in 
amounts less than $10,000. 163 Such schemes exploited the BSA's 
lack of an aggregation requirement and a split in the circuits 
concerning whether individuals should be required to file 
CTRs.164 Under the Money Laundering Control Act, Congress 
159 31 C.F.R. § 103.28 (1990). 
160 31 C.F.R. § 103.33-34 (l990). 
161 31 C.F.R. § 1 03.27(a)(1) (1990). 
162 See 31 c.F.R. § 103.II(p) (1990). "Structuring" is described under current regula-
tions as any technique employed by an individual or individuals to conduct or attempt to 
conduct one or more transactions in currency, in any amount, at one or more financial 
institutions, on one or more days in any manner, for the purpose of evading the reporting 
requirements under the BSA. 
163 See Welling, Smurfs, Money Laundering, and the Federal Criminal Law: The Crime of 
Structuring Transactions, 41 FLA. L. REV. 295-97 (1989). "Smurfing" is one of the techniques 
used to structure transactions to avoid the BSA's reporting requirements. See, e.g., United 
States v. Tobon-Builes, 706 F.2d 1092, 1094 (lIth Cir. 1983) (defendant and companion 
each purchased cashier's checks for $9,000 each at ten different Florida banks in a twenty-
four hour period). 
164 See, e.g., Tobon-Builes, 706 F.2d at 1097-98. Courts did not interpret the BSA to 
require banks to report transactions under $10,000, even if they were made by the same 
individual or individuals on the same day or days and exceeded $10,000 in the aggregate. 
The CRT forms, however, provided that banks should report such multiple transactions. 
See United States v. Anzalone, 766 F.2d 676, 679, n.6 (lst Cir. 1985). Nevertheless, whether 
these instructions could serve as the basis for criminal prosecution was unclear. Welling, 
supra note 163, at 298. Some circuit courts have been reluctant to impose reporting 
requirements on individuals. See United States v. Bucey, 876 F.2d 1297, 1302-06 (7th Cir. 
1989), eert. denied, _U.S. _, llO S. Ct. 565 (l989); United States v. Robinson, 832 F.2d 
1165, 1166 (9th Cir. 1987); United States v. Varbel, 780 F.2d 758, 762 (9th Cir. 1986); 
Anzalone, 766 F.2d at 681. Others, however, have been willing to impose such require-
ments. See United States v. Rigdon, 874 F.2d 774, 777-84 (lIth Cir. 1989), eert. denied, _ 
U.S. _, 110 S. Ct. 374 (1989); United States v. Mouzin, 785 F.2d 682, 688-90 (9th Cir. 
1986), eert. denied, 479 U.S. 985 (1986); United States v. Goldberg, 756 F.2d 949, 955-56 
(2nd Cir. 1985). 
1991] FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE FOR TERRORISM 103 
closed this loophole in 1987 with an amendment to the BSA 
making structuring or "smurfing" a criminal offense. 165 
Prosecution of institutions or individuals which evade or at-
tempt to evade the BSA's provisions requires specific conduct and 
intent to trigger criminal liability.166 As for institutions, prosecu-
tors must establish their failure to file or their filing of inaccurate 
CTRs.167 In addition, prosecutors must also demonstrate their 
willful intent to contravene the BSA's reporting requirements. 
Such willful intent has been defined as knowledge of the BSA's 
requirements or an indifference or conscious avoidance of learn-
ing about the duty to file. 168 In this regard, the First Circuit has 
imposed a "collective knowledge" standard where bank employ-
ees severally failed to file CTRs for multiple cash transactions. 169 
As for individuals, actionable conduct arises when individuals 
structure or attempt to structure their transactions to avoid the 
reporting requirements altogether. 170 Prosecutors need not estab-
lish that such defendants were aware of their unlawful structuring 
but merely that they structured their transactions to evade the 
BSA's requirements. 171 
In addition to BSA violations, defendants are often charged 
with federal conspiracy 172 or concealment of material fact. 173 Con-
spiracy charges arise when individuals act in concert with financial 
institutions to avoid the filing requirements. Even if defendants 
165 Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, Title I, Subtitle H, § 1354(a), 
100 Stat. 3207-22 (codified under 31 U.S.C. § 5324 (1989». The Money Laundering 
Control Act was adopted under the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986. According to its original 
sponsor, Senator Alfonse D'Amato, the amended provisions "close[d] the loophole in 
present law used by launderers of money and other criminal profits." United States v. 
Scanio, 705 F. Supp. 768, 771 (W.D.N.Y. 1988), a/I'd, 900 F.2d 485 (2nd Cir. 1990). 
166 31 U.S.C. § § 5313, 5322, 5324. 
167 See 31 U.S.C. § 5321(b). 
168 See 31 U.S.C. § § 5321(a)(1), 5322(a)-(b); see also United States v. Bank of New 
England NA, 821 F.2d 844, 854-55 (lst Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 943 (1987) 
(conscious avoidance); United States v. Hernando Ospina, 798 F.2d 1570, 1580 (lIth Cir. 
1986); United States v. Eisenstein, 731 F.2d 1540, 1543 (11th Cir. 1984) (knowledge of 
reporting requirement satisfying intent under BSA); United States v. Granda, 565 F.2d 
922,925-26 (5th Cir. 1978). 
169 Bank of New England, 821 F.2d at 856. 
170 See 31 U.S.C. § 5324. 
171 Scanio, 900 F.2d at 491. 
172 See, e.g., United States v. Donahue, 885 F.2d 45, 46 (3rd Cir. 1989) (defendants 
successfully prosecuted under BSA and federal conspiracy charges). 
173 Bucey, 876 F.2d 1297, 1307-08 (defendant unsuccessfully prosecuted under federal 
concealment or falsification provisions pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § § 2(b), 1001). 
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are not liable under the BSA, they can be prosecuted for con-
spiring against the federal government and often face additional 
charges under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiza-
tions Act (RICO).I74 
Beyond the trial context, the BSA also operates to gather useful 
information concerning potential targets for money laundering 
prosecution. For example, the Act provides a "know your cus-
tomer" standard requiring banks to identify and retain records 
of all persons maintaining accounts with their institutions. 175 Reg-
ulations also provide identification procedures for both customers 
and noncustomers who transact over the $10,000 limit. I76 Finan-
cial institutions are required to verify and record the name and 
address of individuals involved in transactions above this limit as 
well as record their account numbers and social security or tax 
identification numbers. Upon receipt of this information, the IRS 
can forward the reports to state and federal investigatory agen-
cies. 177 In turn, such agencies can summon bank officials to testify 
concerning their reports and can release customer information 
relevant to possible violations of any statute or amendment. I78 
Bankers can also disclose suspicious transactions on their own 
initiative. I79 Pursuant to the Right to Financial Privacy Act, a 
financial institution, or any officer, employee, or agent of a finan-
cial institution may disclose to a governmental authority the name 
and any indentifying information concerning the individual, cor-
poration, or account engaged in suspected illegal activity.I80 In-
stitutions or individuals who disclose are free from any liability 
for their disclosure or their failure to notify customers of the 
174 See 18 V.S.C. § 371 (1989); 18 V.S.C. § § 1956-1957 (1990); 31 V.S.C. § 1001 
(1989). 
175 31 C.F.R. § 103.27 (1990). Advisors to the financial community suggest that actively 
screening customers may be the most effective means of determining who may be a 
potential money launderer. Interview with Danforth Newcomb, Attorney, Shearman & 
Sterling, in New York City (Aug. 10, 1990). 
176 31 C.F.R. § 103.28 (1990). 
177 31 V.S.C. § 5319; 31 C.F.R. § 103.43 (1990). 
178 See 31 C.F.R. § 103.61 (1990). 
179 12 V.S.C. § 3403(c) (1989). Pursuant to the Right to Financial Privacy Act, bankers 
may reveal suspicious transactions to authorities. Bankers may report their suspicions to 
the federal government on "criminal referral forms" without liability for making the 
disclosure or for failing to inform the customer of their disclosures. See Villa, A Critical 
View, 37 CATH. V.L. REv. 489, 507 (1988). 
180 12 V.S.C. § 3403(c). 
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disclosure. Such informants may also receive rewards if their 
information leads to convictions under the BSA.181 
IV. COMPARISON OF THE 1989 ACT'S MONEY LAUNDERING 
PROVISIONS WITH ITS V.S. ALTERNATIVE 
The 1989 Act's money laundering provisions under section 11 
burden bankers with a broad definition of actionable conduct, an 
easily satisfied intent standard, draconian penalties, and an ad-
ditional exception to a banker's duty of confidentiality.182 The 
limitations of the 1989 Act are evident in its origins, in compar-
ison with its predecessors, and in contrast with V.S. regulatory 
legislation. 
The Prevention of Terrorism Acts were promulgated in direct 
response to emergency conditions in Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland. 183 The 1974 Act was passed within seven days of a highly 
publicized IRA bombing incident in Great Britain. The subse-
quent Prevention of Terrorism Acts have been passed in reaction 
to continued terrorist violence. 184 Thus, the Prevention of Ter-
rorism Acts can be viewed as summary legislative responses to 
violence rather than judicious initiatives to resolve the underlying 
causes of that violence. 
The 1989 Act's money laundering provisions are themselves 
merely a reaction to a well established problem in Great Britain 
and Northern Ireland: paramilitary-sponsored extortion, racke-
teering, fraud, and control of legitimate businesses. 185 Parliament 
failed to address this problem until 1989.186 Instead, its initial 
efforts under the proscription provisions of the 1974, 1976, and 
1984 Acts criminalized Republican paramilitary fund raising. 187 
Such provisions expressed an official government view that ter-
rorist fund raising was primarily a Republican matter. 188 Parlia-
ment modified this restricted view under section 10 of the 1976 
181 31 U.S.C. § 5323. 
182 See supra notes 9, 114-16, 124, 135-61 and accompanying text. 
183 See supra notes 21-27 and accompanying text. 
184 See supra note 21 and accompanying text. 
185 See supra notes 71, 76, 78-79 and accompanying text. 
186 1989 Act, supra note 2, at pt. III, § 11. 
187 [d. at sched. 1; 1984 Act, supra note 2, at sched. 1; 1976 Act, supra note 2, at sched. 
1; 1974 Act, supra note 2, at sched. 1. 
188 See 1974 Act, supra note 2, at pt. I, § l(b). 
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and 1984 Acts by criminalizing all terrorist fund raising. 189 N ever-
theless, section 10 merely addressed fund raising. In reality, ter-
rorists also rely on third parties to launder tainted proceeds of 
sophisticated fraud, extortion, or racketeering schemes. 19o 
Parliament finally addressed third-party assistance in 1986, al-
though only in the context of drug trafficking. 191 Section 24 of 
the Drug Act created a standard against which the 1989 Act 
provisions can be evaluated. The 1989 Act adopts the general 
format of the Drug Act's money laundering provisions, incor-
porating the offense under section 11, "Assisting in retention or 
control of terrorist funds."192 The 1989 Act, however, differs 
from its model, the Drug Act, in the specific elements of the 
money laundering offense. Under the 1989 Act, the government 
need only establish an objective intent for the commission of the 
laundering offense. 193 For example, under a section 11 offense, 
fact finders must consider what the reasonable bank clerk would 
do in reviewing transactions with potential terrorists. Conversely, 
under section 24 of the Drug Act, accused parties have the ad-
vantage of a subjective intent standard, which requires finders of 
fact to determine what the particular clerk understood and did 
under the given circumstances. 194 This allows defendants to pres-
ent finders of fact with their own circumstances and abilities. 
The subtle differences between the financial assistance provi-
sions of the Drug Act and the 1989 Act are even more dramatic 
with respect to defenses. First, the defense for failure to meet the 
intent requirement differs between the Acts. Under section 24 of 
the Drug Act, defendants can assert lack of knowledge as a de-
fense. 195 Under section 11 of the 1989 Act, however, Parliament 
limited such a defense by requiring defendants to establish that 
they "did not know or had no reasonable cause to suspect" that 
they were involved in terrorist transactions. 196 Thus, defendants 
under the 1989 Act bear the added burden of demonstrating 
that they had no reason to believe they were dealing with terror-
ists. This additional burden on defendants is certainly contrary 
189 See 1984 Act, supra note 2, at pt. III, § 10; 1976 Act, supra note 2, at pt. III, § 10. 
190 See supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text. 
191 Drug Act, supra note 14, at § 24. 
192 Compare 1989 Act, supra note 2, at pt. III, § II with Drug Act, supra note 14, at § 24. 
193 1989 Act, supra note 2, at pt. III, § II (2). 
194 Drug Act, supra note 14, at § 24(l)(b). 
195 [d. at § 24(4)(a). 
196 1989 Act, supra note 2, at pt. III, § 11(2). 
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to Earl Ferrers' assurance that "innocent" defendants will find it 
easy to prove that they had no reason to know or suspect they 
were assisting terrorists. 197 
Earl Ferrers betrays the underlying problem of section 11: its 
drafters assumed that it would only catch guilty money launders. 
Section l1's lower standard of culpability, however, implicates all 
bankers who cannot establish absolute ignorance. 198 This result 
may be mitigated insofar as defendants can demonstrate against 
a "balance of probabilities" that they did not know or reasonably 
suspect they were handling terrorist funds. 199 Nevertheless, the 
intent standard and limited defenses of section 11 effectively 
subject bankers to a presumption of guilt rather than inno-
cence.200 
In addition, the "reasonable excuse" defense under section 12 
exempting defendants from section 11 prosecution is limited by 
section l1's lower standard of culpability.201 Under section 12, 
defendants can assert such a defense but must prove that their 
excuse is justified by what they reasonably should have suspected 
and not merely what they actually believed.202 Alternatively, de-
fendants could argue that while they knew or suspected that they 
where involved with terrorists, they acted under duress. This may 
be the only viable alternative given section II's intent standard 
and the harsh reality of terrorism in Northern Ireland and Great 
Britain. 203 
Ultimately, a defendant's most promising defense is full disclo-
sure. Under the 1989 Act, however, the disclosure provisions of 
sections 12 and 17 conflict. Specifically, under section 12 bankers 
can avoid section 11 liability by disclosing their involvement with 
terrorists or establishing a "reasonable excuse" for their failure 
to disclose.204 They may still, however, face penalties pursuant to 
section 17 if their disclosure prejudices or obstructs police inves-
tigations.205 
197 See supra notes 118-19 and accompanying text. 
198 See supra notes 117, 119 and accompanying text. 
199 See supra note 120 and accompanying text. 
200 See Wheatley, supra note 144, at 499-500. 
201 1989 Act, supra note 2, at pt. III, § 11(2) 
202 [d. at § 12(2)(a). 
203 Bonner, supra note 6, at 460. 
204 1989 Act, supra note 2, at pt. III, § 12. 
205 [d. at pt. V, § 17(2)(a). 
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Barring a successful defense, convicted money launderers face 
penalties under section 13 of the 1989 Act similar to those of the 
Drug Act. Defendants under both statutes are subject to fines 
and fourteen year prison sentences.206 Yet, the government's 
chances of successful prosecution may be greater under section 
11 due to the provision's broadly defined standard of conduct 
and easily satisfied standard of intent. 
In addition, the 1989 Act's disclosure provisions further com-
plicate bankers' common law duty of confidentiality. The Act adds 
an additional statutory exception to the twenty-one exceptions 
listed in the Jack Report. 207 As the Report concluded, the broad 
scope of the exceptions as well as their sheer numbers are prob-
lematic for Northern Irish and British bankers. For example, 
bankers must distinguish between their duties of disclosure under 
the Drug Act in contrast to their duties under the 1989 Act. In 
addition, conflicting provisions within the 1989 Act between a 
duty to disclose under section 12 and a penalty for wrongful 
disclosure under section 17 demonstrate that Parliament has 
failed to provide concise rules on a banker's duty of confiden-
tiality.208 The 1989 Act thereby lacks what the Jack Committee 
considered "the measure of certainty" which bankers need to 
determine whether they are released from their duty of confi-
dentiality. 
U.S. law under the BSA offers a reporting alternative for the 
detection and prosecution of money laundering related to a va-
riety of crimes. Instead of targeting discrete criminal activities 
such as terrorism209 or drug trafficking,210 the BSA focuses on 
financial institutions including, but not limited to, banks and their 
employees.211 Such institutions are required to file reports or 
CTRs with the IRS for transactions above the Act's $lO,OOO 
limit.212 These reports "have a high degree of usefulness in crim-
inal, tax, or regulatory investigations or proceedings"213 because 
criminals, whether tax evaders or drug traffickers, deal in cash,214 
206 Compare 1989 Act, supra note 2, at pt. III, § 13(1)(a)-(b) with Drug Act, supra note 
14, at § 24(5). 
207 See JACK REPORT, supra note 97, at 30. 
208 Id. at 35. 
209 1989 Act, supra note 2, at pt. III, § 11. 
210 Drug Act, supra note 14, at § 24. 
211 See supra note 156 and accompanying text. 
212 31 C.F.R. § 103.22(a)(l) (1990). 
213 See supra note 151 and accompanying text. 
214 See supra notes 153-54 and accompanying text. 
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and the BSA's reporting requirements document their transac-
tions. The CTRs create an audit trail which provides federal and 
state authorities with the names, dates, and social security or tax 
identification numbers of those involved.215 Moreover, U.S. bank-
ers on their own initiative can report suspicious transactions to 
authorities and may even receive rewards if their information 
results in convictions under the BSA.216 
In contrast, the 1989 Act addresses only terrorist money laun-
derers. Instead of supplying authorities with transaction reports 
useful in criminal investigations, bankers in the United Kingdom 
must disclose information to authorities in a manner that will not 
prejudice or obstruct such investigations.217 As an alternative, 
they may screen potential customers to avoid transactions with 
those that they suspect are terrorists. Unlike their U.S. counter-
parts, bankers in the United Kingdom must engage in difficult 
assessments of their customers, and moreover, risk severe pen-
alties if their assessments are wrong. 
Beyond the reporting context, the BSA also offers more specific 
definitions of proscribed conduct than the 1989 Act. For example, 
under the BSA, U.S. bankers are only subject to criminal or civil 
penalties when they fail to file reports, file them inaccurately, or 
structure transactions so as to avoid the reporting require-
ments.218 Bankers in the United Kingdom, however, may be sub-
ject to criminal penalities if they merely enter into or are con-
cerned with arrangements to facilitate the retention or control of 
terrorist funds. 219 
In addition, the BSA offers a higher standard of culpability 
than the 1989 Act. It requires a willful standard rather than the 
easily satisfied "reasonable suspicion" standard of section 11 of 
the 1989 Act. 220 U.S. prosecutors must establish that defendants 
knew of the reporting requirements but failed to report or report 
accurately, or knowingly structured their transactions to avoid 
the requirements. 221 The BSA does not require defendants to 
make difficult assessments and then subsequently demonstrate 
215 31 U.S.C. § 5319; 31 C.F.R. § 103.28 (1990); 31 C.F.R. § 103.43(a)-(b) (1990). 
216 12 U.S.C. § 3403(c). 
217 1989 Act, supra note 2, at pt. III, § § 12, 17. 
218 31 U.S.C. § § 5321, 5322, 5324. 
219 1989 Act, supra note 2, at pt. III, § 11(1). 
220 See supra notes 168-71 and accompanying text. 
221 31 U .S.C. § § 5321, 5324. 
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that they had no reason to suspect that they were handling ter-
rorist funds. 222 
CONCLUSION 
The 1989 Act, born of violence to address violence, stipulates 
stiff standards of conduct, intent, and disclosure. The Act also 
adds an additional exception to the already confused state of 
bankers' confidentiality law. Moreover, section 11 fails to address 
money laundering as a systemic problem, treating terrorist money 
laundering separately and more severely than its drug trafficking 
counterpart. Finally, it fails to distinguish adequately between 
unwitting assistance and willful involvement with terrorists' 
funds; both are punished to the same degree. 
As an alternative, the BSA offers a uniformly applied proce-
dural approach to money laundering prosecution. It also offers 
a more narrowly defined standard for actionable conduct and a 
willful intent standard. In addition, U.S. bankers are encouraged 
to know their customers and are free to disclose suspicious trans-
actions without the threat of criminal or civil liability. 
Parliament should reconsider adopting money laundering pro-
visions similar to the BSA. Such legislation imposes reporting 
requirements and prescribes higher standards of culpability, and 
specific conduct. Moreover, the BSA's more liberal disclosure 
provisions encourage bankers to-assist the government in detect-
ing terrorist money laundering schemes. 
The 1989 Act's money laundering provisions cast easily reached 
bankers, rather than terrorists, as the subjects of money launder-
ing prosecutions. A reporting requirement similar to the BSA 
would refocus the money laundering offense on those terrorists 
who raise and launder funds. To end the violence, Parliament 
should deputize the financial community rather than count it 
among the enemy. 
Margaret M. Ross 
222 See supra notes 114-16, 166-71 and accompanying text. 
